In the wake of the interruption of the negotiations in mid-2017, this study aims to investigate and underline the reasons that led to the new failure in the Cyprus talks. Why did the negotiations collapse after a remarkable two-year effort? Who were the main protagonists in this fiasco? What were the main points of disagreement at the negotiations' table? What were the disputes in the fields of security and equality? What was the role of local society in the failure? This analysis attempts to answer the questions mentioned above by putting the official positions of the two sides and the related opinion articles and publications which have had an impact on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot press, under its microscope.
Introduction
Ten years after the rejection of the United Nations' reunification plan (Annan Plan), the ascendance of two political men with a federal agenda to the leadership of the two communities In the wake of the interruption of the negotiations, this study aims to investigate and underline the reasons that led to the new failure in the Cyprus talks. Why did the negotiations collapse after a remarkable two-year effort? Who were the main protagonists in this fiasco?
What were the main points of disagreement at the negotiations' table? What were the disagreements in the fields of security and equality? What was the role of local society in the failure? This analysis attempts to answer the questions mentioned above by putting under the microscop the official positions of the two sides and the related opinion articles and publications which have had an impact on the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot press. As part of this effort, we benefit from the rich archive of newspapers from the periods between 2008-2010 and 2015-2016 . For our analysis, we have chosen to research the Greek Cypriot newspapers and news sites ' Χαραυγή', 'Σημερινή-Sigmalive', 'Πολίτης', 'Newsbomb' and Concerning the point mentioned above, we should underline that in aiming to provide a more comprehensive reading of the latest developments in the Cyprus issue, we will not limit our analysis to the negotiation process of the last two years. In the following sections, our study highlights the fundamental disagreements that emerged at the negotiating table during the leadership of Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat (2008 Talat ( -2010 . Moving on we will be focusing on the current phase of the Cyprus talks, with some notable variations, the analysis of which goes beyond the limits of our study.
Thus, with the help of rich archive material, we will be approaching the new failure in the negotiation process on a multidimensional level that will include the points of views of both communities. Within this framework, our study focuses on the three elements that contributed to the new failure. In the first section of our research, we will discuss the disagreement of the two communities regarding the element of security. As is known, the dramatic events and the armed confrontation of the 1963-1974 period have cast a dark shadow over the relations between the two communities which have since attached great importance to the security factor.
The Turkish Cypriot community firmly believes that the presence of the Turkish Armed Forces on the island will ensure its safety from threats such as the Greek Cypriot majority. For its part, the Greek Cypriot side calls for the immediate removal from the island of the Turkish army, which is described as an 'occupation army '. In the second section, we will approach the issue of equality between the two communities and the different approaches of both sides to this vital aspect of the Cyprus Problem. Political equality is perceived by the Turkish Cypriots as an additional 'barrack' that will ensure the community's survival in the face of the danger of assimilation as a result of the Greek Cypriot majority's dominating tendencies. For its part, the Greek Cypriot community rejects the said accusations and claims that its vision for a federal Cyprus insures the peaceful co-existence of all Cypriots in conditions of freedom and equality. Moving on, in the third section, we will focus on the absence of society from the process of solving the Cyprus Problem. The study of the attitude of the local press toward the talks will help us understand that 'high politics' was not the only factor contributing to the negative outcome. 'Low politics', namely the societies of both communities, had a significant part in the said failure.
In discussing the three elements of the new failure in the Cyprus talks, the present study wishes to provide researchers, the academic community, politicians and diplomats with a roadmap that contains answers to many questions concerning the multidimensional negotiating process of the Cyprus issue.
The three elements of the failure
The element of security: the Turkish Cypriot insistence on the continuation of the guarantee system, Turkey's stake and the Greek Cypriot Veto
Beyond the original goal of the two communities to unite Cyprus with their respective 'motherland countries', at the epicentre of the Cyprus Problem, which for half a century has attracted the attention of global public opinion, we identify the problem of political equality, which we will analyse in more detail in the next section. In the early 1960s, the disagreement about the principle of political equality led to an armed struggle that lasted about a decade, the Turkish invasion of the island and the de facto partition of Cyprus. According to the Greek Cypriot side, the Turkish Cypriot community was a minority which unjustifiably insisted on claiming excessive rights and privileges. For its part, the Turkish Cypriot community approached the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus as a unique structure, which resembled other modern federations and constitutively guaranteed the political equality of the two communities regardless of the existing population ratio of the island. The unbridgeable gap between these two approaches led Cyprus to a bloody civil war that lasted from 1963 until 1974.
In the early 1960s, the disagreement surrounding the principle of political equality and the division of the powers and structures in the new democracy went hand in hand with one of the critical elements of the Cyprus Problem, the issue of security. Forty-three years after the de facto partition of Cyprus, the two sides continue to disagree on the subject of the security model that will be established in Cyprus along with the founding of the new federation. The Greek Cypriot side demands the transformation of the security and guarantee system on the island into a new model according to which the Turkish army will have a symbolic role, and new safeguards will be created to respond to the fears and concerns of the two communities that arose after the events of 1963 and 1974. The Turkish Cypriot side rejects this proposal, stressing that the perpetuation of the presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus is necessary to safeguard and monitor the principle of political equality and to ensure the safety of Turkish Cypriots. In a similar tone, Turkey points out that while there are unrest and bloody confrontations in the broader region, the need to safeguard her interests prevent her from withdrawing the army forces stationed on the island.
According to Turkish Cypriots, the presence of the Turkish army on the island is a necessary condition for the achievement and preservation of a solution. Within this framework, the army's role is to guarantee the security and stability of the proposed federation, the The Greek Cypriots on their part oppose the prolongation of the presence of the Turkish army on the island and also demand the abolition of the right of intervention provided to Turkey by the guarantee treaty. At the same time, the community advocates the creation of alternative structures and security mechanisms that will ensure peace and stability within the island, without the need for military intervention by a force foreign to Cyprus. During the period 2008-2010, the Greek Cypriot side reserved the most severe stance for the issue of guarantees.
Immediately after his election to the leadership of his community, Christofias specified that, since the war of 1974, the Greek Cypriots had grown to fear and mistrust the Turkish military and called for the revision of the system of guarantees as well as the withdrawal of the army troops. As the government's spokesman, Stefanos Stefanou stressed:
'The Government's fundamental position is that the presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus since 1974 and the continuing occupation of a significant part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus constitute the cause of problems and of the Cyprus Issue itself.'
As mentioned above, Christofias' leadership didn't aim at the absolute abolition of the system of guarantees. As underlined in a publication of Politis, the Greek Cypriot side wished to review the guarantees system: '(...) Several models that could replace or vary the existing system of guarantees are already examined and discussed behind the scenes. The two sides appear, at this time, to have diametrically opposite views. The G/C side pursues the review the guarantees, but not the abolition of the Treaty of 60', which would jeopardise the continuation and transformation of the Republic of Cyprus into a federal state. (...) The European military force will include Greek, Turkish and British forces. (...) The commander of the force must be European. (...) The idea of establishing NATO forces on the island which will take over security has not been excluded. ' The specific strategy remained in force during the leadership of Nikos Anastasiades.
Supported by Athens, Anastasiades' administration demanded the immediate revision of the system of guarantees, mainly the abolition of the right of intervention and its replacement with a new alternative security model, in which the Turkish army would not play the leading role.
In mid-2017, the unbridged gap in the security aspect of the Cyprus Problem played a decisive role in the collapse of new efforts to find a solution. The Greek Cypriot leader's related comment is evidence of the situation that was created: ' We deeply regret that Turkey's unwillingness to negotiate within the framework set by the UN Secretary-General, and in particular Turkey's intransigent stance on the key chapters of security and guarantees, and its insistence on maintaining guarantees, troops and intervention rights in reunited Cyprus, did not allow for a positive outcome during the Conference on Cyprus in Crans Montana, Switzerland this past July, President Anastasiades pointed out. (…) The Turkish Foreign Minister repeated Turkey`s traditional positions on maintaining a system of security and guarantees, and a permanent presence of troops on a reunited Cyprus. Moreover, contrary tο the UN framework on territorial adjustments, Turkey steadfastly refused to address Greek Cypriot concerns. ' Rejecting the positions of the Greek Cypriot side, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Ankara clarified that they were ready to discuss only the transformation of the system of guarantees under a transitional plan that would ensure the presence of the Turkish army in the northern part of the island as part of the solution. The Turkish Cypriot side also advocated maintaining 'special relations' with Turkey in the field of security. For the second biggest community of Cyprus, in the new formula of the solution, the 'effective assurance of Turkey' was a necessity in order to secure equality, freedom and security in the whole island.
Thus, 43 years after the 1974 war, the issue of security once again stood in the way of the peaceful coexistence of the two communities and the immediate solution of the Cyprus Problem. In addition to the fear and suspicion of one community regarding to the true intentions of the other, in the framework of the new impasse, the element of security was directly linked to another major obstacle that the two sides did not manage to overcome: the element of the political equality, which we analyse further in the next section of our study.
The elements of political equality: two different approaches for the United Cyprus
Federation 43 years after the de facto partition of the island, the element of security contributed to the emergence of the talks' new impasse. The archival material shows that the element of security is at the epicentre of the Cyprus Problem and that the issue of political equality is its starting point.
In the mid-20th century, the Greek Cypriot side attempted to integrate Cyprus into Greece, assuming that the Turkish Cypriot minority of the island would not object if it was awarded several political privileges. But the Turkish Cypriot side not only rejected the plan but at the same time called for the establishment of a federation that would not take into account the population ratio of Cyprus and would be based on the principle of equal political representation.
The Turkish side proposed the partition of the island if the plan for Greek-Turkish comanagement of the Cyprus would be rejected. This difference in opinions and goals eventually paved the way for the dramatic events of the summer of 1974.
Today, 43 years after the war of 1974, the element of the political equality continues to play a crucial role in discussions about the future of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot side agrees to discuss the possibility of the transformation of the Republic of Cyprus from a unitary state, which has been under its control since 1963, into a federation. According to this plan, the Turkish Cypriots will enjoy a number of rights and privileges, with the precondition that those will not overshadow or hinder the smooth functioning of the new bi-communal structure. But at the same time, the Greek Cypriot side is reluctant to reveal the details of the said plan, if the Turkish Cypriot side does not beforehand accept its positions on the issue of security. These preconditions are a matter of concern for the Turkish Cypriot side, which regards the principle of equality and thus its active participation in the new federation, as a cornerstone of the desired solution.
During the leadership of Demetris Christofias, the Greek Cypriots focused on the objective of reintegrating the Turkish Cypriot community and the northern part of the island into the structures and the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, the ultimate aim of the Greek From the standpoint of Demetris Christofias's leadership then, the ultimate aim is the reunification of Cyprus through the transformation of the Republic. The Greek Cypriot leadership believed that this particular strategy would also offer a solution to the problem of 'invasion and occupation' by removing the 'state structure' that was de facto created in the northern part of the island in 1983. According to the Greek Cypriot side, the 'TRNC' was illegally established. Thus it controls unlawfully 37% of the island's territory and the lives of the Turkish Cypriot community. Within this framework, the Greek Cypriots believe that the reintegration of the 37% of the island and the Turkish Cypriot community into the federally transformed Republic will not only offer a solution to the illegality that is the 'TRNC', but also guarantee that a two-state structure will not be established on the island.
For Demetris Christofias's leadership, the transformation of the Cyprus state from a single state structure into a federal state structure means creating two autonomous provinces, in which each community will have the right to manage its affairs separately. But under no circumstances are the autonomous provinces to be identified with 'state structures'. Also, the Greek Cypriot side claims that the 'effective' participation of the Turkish Cypriot community in decision-making mechanisms and the principle of rotating presidency that ensures the frequent alternation of elected presidents coming from both communities, indicates in effect political equality. However, in no case, does the Greek Cypriot side accept the idea of the representation of the two communities in the new federation based on the principle of arithmetic equality.
Thus, when the two communities met at the negotiating table during the period 2008-2010 the difference of opinion was evident on issues such as the bi-communal composition of public structures and the distribution of power in the new federal state.
According to the archival material we have collected, Nicos Anastasiades followed in the footsteps of his predecessor on the Cyprus issue. Within this framework Anastasiades, having obtained the support of Christofias's party that was then in opposition, supported the transformation of the Republic of Cyprus into a federation. According to Haravgi, the ultimate aim of the Greek Cypriot side during the new period remained the reintegration of the northern part of the island in the territory of the Republic through its transformation into a federation and the avoidance of the creation of two independent states on the island of Cyprus.
During the period we are studying, both Turkish Cypriot leaderships that were elected to office, strove to ensure the constitutional and international legitimisation of the 'state structure' which was established in 1983 in the northern part of the island. Mehmet Ali Talat's leadership, taking into account the impact that the unrecognised status of the 'TRNC' had on Turkish Cypriot political and social-economic life (through its resulting isolation from the international community), tried during the period 2008-10 to launch an updated and modernised form of the Annan Plan. According to this new strategy, the Turkish Cypriot side would no longer aim for international recognition of the 'TRNC' as a sovereign and independent state structure, but would strive to transform it into a founding member-element of the new United Cyprus '(The new federation) will have two founding nations. We agreed on a bi-zonal bicommunal federation (...). We do not claim that this system will be identical to that of the US. As you know, the United States has a unique system. (...) From my perspective, it is clear that the new federation will consist of the Republic of Cyprus and the 'TRNC'.
For the Turkish Cypriot leadership, the plan to transform the 'TRNC' into a founding state of the new federation with increased responsibilities and powers is the core of the principle of political equality. Within this framework, the Turkish Cypriot side underlines the importance that arithmetic equality has for its community, while the Greek Cypriot leadership insists on the principal of political equality that entails that the Turkish Cypriot minority will be represented Concluding the second section of our study, we would like to emphasise that the elements of the impasse preventing the solution of the Cyprus Problem can be traced not only to longstanding issues like security and equality but also to more current developments that have affected the island's internal political arena during the last decade. The presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus and the referendum on the modification of the Turkish constitution are some of the contributing factors to the new impasse.
The element of society: the local community's lack of engagement with the peace and reconciliation process-examples from the press
Since the middle of the last century, that is to say since the dawn of the Cyprus Problem, talks on the final solution of the problem were a matter of interest exclusively to foreign governments, the UN and the two leaders. Apart from the bloody civil war period, during which members of the two communities attempted to take the law into their own hands following the instructions of their leaders and the short phase of mass demonstrations in connection with the Annan Plan, Cyprus's societies themselves have never played a leading role in the bilateral talks. It is our opinion that the societies' disengagement from the negotiation process, in combination with the obstacles arising regarding the issues of security and equality, contributes to the repeated failure of the joint talks for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. We will attempt to analyse this deadlock and its association with the element of society we in the third section of our study. 'The Turkish Cypriot (leader) does not abide by Christofias's thoughts' ' We do not accept a lukewarm bi-zonality' Both in the titles and the content of the publications mentioned above 'aggressive' and 'negative' terms such as 'provocation', 'veto', 'hard' etc. are 'Osman Ertug, who spoke in Halkin Sesi said that the President's declaration stating that "the Turkish Cypriots would have the majority of the population and property (in the northern part of the island, after the solution)" is a welcome development. However, he emphasises that he (Akıncı) did not refer to the term "absolute (majority)". Ertug stated that: "In the issues of population and property the absolute majority is important. The percentage of the absolute majority will be determined by the two sides in the talks." At the presidential press conference, we did not hear the term "absolute (majority)". In the relevant report which had also been adopted by the UN Security Council, the term absolute majority is used. This is very important. The 1% is a majority. But yet, this is not enough.'
The Greek Cypriot newspaper Simerini adopted a similarly 'cautious' and pessimistic attitude during the period of the bilateral talks between the leaders Christofias and Talat. The newspaper did not rush to adopt any eschatological speculations for the future of the negotiations, but still opted to remind its readers that the positive climate in relations between the two communities would not be enough to overcome the major obstacles that might occur during the negotiation process:
'Despite the creation of a positive climate between the leaders of the two communities, mainly because of social interaction, direct negotiations will continue today under the dense shade-which is not publicly mentioned yet-of the positions put forward by the Turkish Cypriot team regarding a number of relevant chapters of the Cyprus Issue. According to Simerini's information from the team of legal advisors that supports both the President of the Republic and the Greek Cypriot negotiator, it is reported that divergences from the Turkish Cypriot side are limited to the level of the atmosphere and mood under which the dialogue is conducted. "In the essence of the chapters, not only were substantial positive variations recorded, but in some cases, there is slippage which is likely to cause many problems in the course of the talks," a member of the team commented to our newspaper.' Thus, journalism, the 'mirror' of modern societies, indicates how during the periods discussed above the two communities continue to face each other with suspicion and concern. In short, in a social and political environment where the feeling of distrust and suspicion toward the 'other' sets the political and diplomatic agenda, avoiding a stalemate on the issues of security and political equality is a challenging task.
Conclusion: transforming the three obstacles to opportunities for a solution
This paper sheds light on a crucial turning point in the history of the Cyprus Problem.
In mid-2017, the two communities of Cyprus were close to forming an agreement regarding a solution framework that would pave the way for separate referenda on both sides of the Green Line. In the previous sections, we saw how the three elements of security, equality and society functioned as obstacles to the negotiation process and contributed to the loss of this opportunity. The two sides have failed to settle the issue of the security of the new federation. The Turkish Cypriot side insisted that the Turkish army must remain in the island after the implementation of the solution, while the Greek Cypriot side demanded its immediate its withdrawal from Cyprus. At the same, in the field of the political equality, the two sides had different positions. As for the element of society, the peoples of both communities have once again failed to overcome their feelings of mistrust of the 'other'. They limited themselves to the role of the spectator and allowed pessimistic voices within the two communities to dominate the public sphere and to smear all the efforts to find a solution to the Problem.
In short, it is our opinion that the solution to the Cyprus Problem will be significantly advanced if, in the future, the two communities manage to transform these three elements from obstacles into opportunities. This analysis suggests that in the future, the fields of co-operation and bridges of communication between the two communities will increase. In particular, if the two communities manage to agree on a transitional period regarding the issue of security which will ensure safety and stability both inside and outside the new federation, then a significant obstacle on the road to a solution will have been lifted. For this to happen, the two sides should decide on the legal framework surrounding the pre-agreed limited time presence of foreign troops on the island during the transitional period and the future of the invasive rights that the three guarantor powers, namely Turkey, Greece and Great Britain, have since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. Both these issues of security have been a 'red line' for the two communities, and the leaderships have not shown the required political will to make the necessary compromises that would take the Cyprus Problem one step closer to a solution. Also, Turkey's insistence on the perpetuation of the existing circumstances on the issue of security makes it even more difficult to reach an agreement. Thus we wonder, couldn't the two sides agree to appease each other's and Turkey's fears by negotiating the extension of the transitional period in exchange for the definitive abolition of invasive rights at the end of the interim period? Or could they not agree to an alternative framework for the issue of security that would entail a portion of the Turkish army remaining in the northern part of the island under pre-approved conditions after the transitional period?
If the political leaderships show the required determination for a compromise solution and if the local societies choose to overcome their fear of the 'other', then the obstacle of security could be transformed into an opportunity.
Moving further down the road, for the solution of the Cyprus Problem the two sides will also have to reach an agreement on the issue of implementing the principle of political equality. In this field, as in the case of security, the two sides need to compromise by finding the balance between appeasing the Turkish Cypriots' fears that their political status will be demoted by the majority and the Greek Cypriots' concerns that crucial decisions of the new federation will be blocked by the minority.
Within this framework, two factors may have a fundamental role in transforming these obstacles into opportunities for the solution of the Cyprus Issue. First, the Greek Cypriots must recognise the importance that adequate representation in all structures of the federation has for the Turkish Cypriot community and second the commitment of both communities to create appropriate political and legal safeguards for the smooth functioning of the new alliance.
A possible solution to the issues we have discussed above requires launching the procedure of an all-embracing dialogue between the leaderships and societies of the two communities. The transformation of obstacles into opportunities is a task for which the two political leaders must show willingness. Also, the political will of the two leaders must remain unaffected by political power struggles both internally and externally. During the period we are studying, the political will of the leaders has wavered in line with current developments. Taking into account the upcoming electoral contests and the political events on both sides of the Green Line as well as in Greece and Turkey, it is our opinion that a similar development will not be avoided shortly. But the active involvement of the local societies in the solution process and the pressure they can apply may keep the leaders' political will from shifting. By active participation, we don't mean only the direct involvement of society in the talks but also the establishment of communication and co-operation channels between the two communities in the fields of culture, education and the economy etc. The energy reserves of Cyprus and collective economic partnerships, e.g. the joint project of rebuilding the buffer zone and the closed city of Famagusta, as well as bi-communal efforts to address the problems of everyday life and the economy could play a fundamental role in this process.
In conclusion, if the leaderships and societies of two communities fail to create a climate of confidence in bilateral relations and fail to turn current obstacles into opportunities for a solution, the de facto partition of Cyprus will be definitive. In this case, a public debate should be launched to determine a new model of resolution since the two sides have so far failed to impose their versions on one another.
